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Mature industrial sectors (e.g., aviation) collect their real
world failures in incident databases to inform safety improve-
ments. Intelligent systems currently cause real world harms
without a collective memory of their failings. As a result,
companies repeatedly make the same mistakes in the design,
development, and deployment of intelligent systems. A col-
lection of intelligent system failures experienced in the real
world (i.e., incidents) is needed to ensure intelligent systems
benefit people and society. The AI Incident Database is an
incident collection initiated by an industrial/non-profit coop-
erative to enable AI incident avoidance and mitigation. The
database supports a variety of research and development use
cases with faceted and full text search on more than 1,000
incident reports archived to date.
1 Introduction
Governments, corporations, and individuals are increasingly
deploying intelligent systems to safety-critical problem ar-
eas, including transportation (NTSB 2017) and law enforce-
ment (Dressel and Farid 2018), as well as challenging social
system domains such as recruiting (Dastin 2018). Failures
of these systems pose serious risks to life and wellbeing,
but even good-intentioned intelligent system developers fail
to imagine what can go wrong when their systems are de-
ployed in the real world. Worse, the artificial intelligence
system community has no formal systems whereby practi-
tioners can discover and learn from the mistakes of the past.
Individuals in technology (Olsson 2019), legal practice (Hall
2020), and reputation management (Pownall 2020) now col-
lect artificial intelligence failure history on Google Docs and
GitHub. While these are admirable efforts, a person check-
ing for problems matching their technology or problem do-
main will need to page through lists of links to find ones
of potential relevance. Existing lists are difficult to use in
development, are not comprehensive archives, and are rep-
resentative of individual viewpoints of artificial intelligence
(AI) failures in the real world.
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Figure 1: The US National Transportation Safety Board’s
(NTSB’s) database shown above indexes incident and acci-
dent timelines, location, meteorology, severity, aircraft, op-
erators, and phase of flight as facets. The reports also have a
full text narrative that is searchable. Upon completion of an
investigation, the report is indexed alongside the case record
within the database (Federal Aviation Administration 2020).
Avoiding repeated AI failures requires making past fail-
ures known to AI practitioners. Therefore, we introduce a
systematized collection of incidents where intelligent sys-
tems have caused safety, fairness, or other real world prob-
lems. The AI Incident Database (AIID) answers the ques-
tion, “what can go wrong when someone deploys this sys-
tem”?
The contributions of this work are 3 fold. We provide in-
frastructure supporting best practices within the artificial in-
telligence industry, a dataset of more than 1 thousand inci-
dent reports, and an architecture for building research prod-
ucts on the growing collection of incidents. We begin by ex-
ploring incident databases in other fields of practice before
introducing the system architecture of the AIID. We then























2 Other Incident Databases
The commercial air travel industry owes much of its increas-
ing safety to systematically analyzing and archiving past ac-
cidents and incidents within a shared database. In aviation,
an accident is a case where substantial damage or loss of
life occurs. Incidents are cases where the risk of an accident
substantially increases. For example, when a small fire is
quickly extinguished in a cockpit it is an “incident” but if the
fire burns crew members in the course of being extinguished
it is an “accident.” The aviation database (see Figure 1) in-
dexes flight log data and subsequent expert investigations
into comprehensive examinations of both technological and
human factors. In part due to this continual self-examination,
air travel is one of the safest forms of travel. Decades of
iterative improvements to safety systems and training have
decreased fatalities 81 fold since 1970 when normalized for
passenger miles (Mediavilla 2020).
Aviation accidents share a well-defined operational con-
text, but intelligent systems can be applied to all contexts.
The comprehensive nature of “intelligence” means AI inci-
dent databases ingest unforeseen and novel contexts, tech-
nologies, and failures. The AIID design outlined in the next
section introduces a system architecture inspired by the avi-
ation incident and accident database, but with a greater em-
phasis on extensibility.
The second incident database inspiring the AIID is
the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) sys-
tem, which contains 141, 076 publicly disclosed cyberse-
curity vulnerabilities and exposures (The MITRE Corpora-
tion 2020). In contrast to the aviation database, which serves
users associated with a single industry, the CVE site serves
as critical security infrastructure across all industries by en-
abling vulnerabilities to be circulated and referenced with
a consistent identifier. Other systems consume the identi-
fiers to apply taxonomies (e.g., the Common Vulnerabil-
ity Scoring System), produce research, and develop more
secure software. The creation of numbered identifications
forms community infrastructure that the field of artificial in-
telligence currently lacks. The lists of Olsson (2019), Hall
(2020), and Pownall (2020) lack the comprehensive cover-
age, identification, and extensibility properties of the CVE,
and the full text search capability of the NTSB database.
3 The AI Incident Database
The AIID indexes more than 1,000 publicly available “in-
cident reports,” which are a mixture of documents from the
popular, trade, and academic press. Multiple reports often
pertain to a single incident collectively joined together by
a single identifier. For example, incident number 3 is com-
posed of 18 reports on the Boeing 737 MAX 8 crashes (Ols-
son 2018a). The variety of reports serves several purposes.
First, it provides multiple viewpoints on incidents for which
there is often disagreement about fair characterizations. In
the Boeing case, people disagree on the extent to which tech-
nological or human factors played a part in the tragedies.
Second, the number of publications and publication types
serves as a proxy for interest in the incident. More reported
incidents are typically more damaging, more sensational, or
Figure 2: Incident numbers enumerate AI incidents within
the database and join together incident reports. Incidents
are citeable and are credited to the person who first submit-
ted an incident report for a new incident. The incidents are
intentionally untitled because incident descriptions tend to
change through time as more is learned and achieving con-
sensus titles by both corporate and non-profit database par-
ticipants would be difficult.
both. After opening the AIID to public submissions, we ex-
pect incident 3 will have thousands of incident reports due to
intense public interest in the safety of flight. Lastly, sampling
multiple reports per incident gives a more complete cover-
age of the words applicable to an incident and increases the
likelihood of users discovering incidents relevant to their use
cases. The use cases are detailed in the following user sto-
ries.
User: Product Managers. Corporate product managers
are responsible for defining product requirements before and
during product development. If a product manager discov-
ers incidents where intelligent systems have caused harms
in the past, they can introduce product requirements to mit-
igate risk of recurrence. For example, when a product man-
ager is specifying a recommender system for children, the
AIID should facilitate the discovery of incident 1 (Yampol-
skiy 2020), wherein YouTube Kids recommended inappro-
priate content. Knowledge of incident 1 would produce a
range of technological, marketing, and content moderation
requirements for the product.
User: Risk Officers. Organizationally, risk officers are
tasked with reducing the strategic, reputational, operational,
financial, and compliance risks associated with an enter-
prise’s operation. Consider the case of a social network
preparing to launch a new automatic translation feature. A
search of “translate” within the AIID returns 40 separate
reports, included among them an incident wherein a social
media status update of “good morning” translated to “attack
them” and resulted in the user’s arrest (Anonymous 2017).
After discovering the incident, the risk officer can read re-
ports and analyses to learn that it is currently impossible to
technologically prevent this sort of mistake from happening,
but there is a variety of best practices in mitigating risk, such
as clearly indicating the text is a machine translation.
User: Engineers. Engineers can also benefit from check-
ing the AIID to learn more about the real world their systems
are deployed within. Consider the case of an engineer who
is making a self driving car with a image recognition sys-
tem. The experience of incident 36 (Olsson 2018b), where
a woman in China was shamed for jaywalking because her
picture was on the side of a bus, shows hows images can con-
fuse image recognition systems. Such cases must therefore
be represented within safety tests.
User: Researchers. Safety and fairness researchers al-
ready employ case study methodologies in their scholarship,
but they presently lack the capacity to track AI incidents
at the population level. For example, it is difficult to show
the rate at which incidents involving policing are changing
through time. An AIID search for “policing” in the full text
of reports currently returns 14 distinct incidents. Each of
these incidents are additionally citeable (see Figure 2) within
research papers. The resulting research papers can then be
added to the database as further reporting on the incident.
Additionally, researchers can show the importance of their
publications by citing incidents that could potentially be mit-
igated through their advances.
Finally, we note that making a database entry shareable
(i.e., linkable) empowers these users rhetorically to convince
others that mitigation is necessary. Technology companies
are famous for their penchant to move quickly without eval-
uating all potential bad outcomes. When bad outcomes are
enumerated and shared, it becomes impossible to proceed in
ignorance of harms.
System Architecture
The AIID is a project of the Partnership on AI (PAI), which
is a multi-stakeholder organization funded by technology
companies and governed by a board of directors split be-
tween corporate partners and non-profit civil society organi-
zations. The dual nature of the organization means prescrip-
tive norms are difficult to promulgate. For example, in 2018,
Google unveiled a dataset and competition meant to combat
bias in computer vision classifiers (Doshi 2018). Discussion
within the partnership’s Fairness, Transparency, and Ac-
countability working group briefly entertained providing a
PAI endorsement for the program, but such an endorsement
proved impossible due to vigorous debate on whether com-
puter vision should be improved in human contexts. Such
debates are both a great weakness of PAI and also its great-
est asset as a multi-stakeholder organization. Through forced
exposure to diametrically opposed views, it becomes possi-
ble for both sides to incrementally iterate and find common
ground. The AIID provides infrastructure joining together
these disparate viewpoints so that they can speak for them-
selves and avoids providing top-down analysis or narrative.
Instead, it is the responsibility of the open source commu-
nity to layer taxonomies and summaries onto the database.
This mirrors practices by the CVE system, which provides
the identifier to a surrounding security community ecosys-
tem.
The AIID is a collection of web applications that inter-
faces with a MongoDB document database storing incident
report text and metadata. The first application developed for
the database is the “Discover” application, which is built
to help users discover past incidents relevant to their work.
Figure 3 shows one search in the Discover application. All
searches in the Discover application are “instant searches,”
meaning they return results in less than a second. Another
application is the “Submit” application, which is a form for
submitting links to publicly available incident reports. As
the database grows, the Submit application will grow in so-
phistication to resolve new report submissions to existing
incidents. Incident reports are often written and submitted
long after the initial creation of an incident record and re-
solving new submissions to already indexed incidents will
require additional tooling.
The system architecture is built to express the full range
of viewpoints represented by the PAI partner community
by allowing partners to build their own taxonomies, taxon-
omy documentation, and data summaries (see Figure 7). The
taxonomy system is built to be interoperable, meaning tags
are namespaced and can be faceted (i.e. filtered). For exam-
ple, Figure 6 shows how taxonomies defined in Industry and
Fairness namespaces can be faceted within the Discover ap-
plication. Namespaces are managed by individual or groups
of partners and thus are not necessarily representative of the
whole PAI ecosystem. This avoids the challenge of devel-
oping a single shared universal ontology for AI incidents
and instead allows for multiple viewpoints on the data to de-
velop and compete for mindshare. All incident reports have
metadata captured on entry into the database, including ti-
tle, source, author, submitter, publication date, incident date,
and incident number. These are all objective facts that can be
filtered as shown in Figure 3. These facets are also where we
introduce subjective taxonomic classification of reports and
incidents.
The applications are hosted within the context of a web
application combining documentation, data products (see
Figure 5), and social credit (see Figure 4). The problem
with these database views is that they often require iterat-
ing over the complete database. If these pages render for the
user every time the user visits the page, the database would
be slow and expensive to host. Instead, the AIID periodi-
cally pre-renders database views as static web applications,
which means they only require a single database request at
the time the website builds. As such, it is possible to de-
velop a gallery of views into the data similar to the D3JS
gallery, which has 168 different visualization examples (Bo-
stock 2020). One potential AIID example is supporting trend
analysis for unsupervised topic models or hand tailored topic
models monitoring technology, affected populations, or ap-
plications through time. These analyses can be incorporated
into the static build (see Figure 7) and update automatically
when the website updates.
4 Conclusion
We expect the extensible architecture will provide for the
most pragmatic coverage of AI incidents through time while
reducing negative consequences from AI in the real world.
Early indications of adoption are strong. Even prior to pub-
lishing the database, we have received collaboration re-
quests from “Big 4” accounting firms, international consul-
tancies, law firms, research institutes, and individual aca-
demics. Through time we hope the database will develop
from the work product of a small team of individuals into
community owned infrastructure aligned with producing the
most beneficial intelligent systems for people and society. To
quote Santayana, “Progress, far from consisting in change,
Figure 3: A user has entered “facial recognition” as a search term into the search box of the “Discover” AIID application. 89
reports returned to the search instantaneously (every keystroke filters the results and the page renders) and the matching text
from the reports is snippeted. The publications represented within the results are faceted in the left column along with the
authors, submitters, and incident numbers to support filtering the reports based on their metadata.
depends on retentiveness... Those who cannot remember the
past are condemned to repeat it.” (Santayana and Cory 1924)
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Figure 7: Fairness domain partners create a new application for the AIID named “FairnessExplorer,” which includes both a tax-
onomy and a summary page. Upon pushing the code to GitHub, a build on the static website hosting service Netlify is triggered.
The build process queries the database to generate static summaries of the database contents, including the Fairness Summary.
The website then deploys to a global content distribution network. Users can then apply classifications within the scope of
the FairnessExplorer taxonomy. Industry partners can then filter incidents based on the classifications of the FairnessExplorer
taxonomy, as well as taxonomies developed by other domain partners.
